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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Trade secrets are valuable business assets that play important roles in both 
economic growth and in fostering innovation,1 as trade secrets can protect both 
technical (e.g. a pesticide formula, a chocolate cookie recipe, or an electronic 
board game scheme) and non-technical information (e.g. “customer lists, sales 
data, or business strategies”).2  In the United States (U.S.), there exists widely 
established case law and statutory law on trade secret protection,3 for example, 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA),4 which has been adopted in forty-nine 
U.S. states,5 and the Economic Espionage Act (EEA),6 which protects trade 
secrets at the federal level.  In the European Union (EU), there is no harmonized 
law regarding the protection of trade secrets, and the national laws of twenty-
eight EU Member States offer various interpretations of trade secrets, and rather 
different protections for trade secrets.  On November 28, 2013, the European 
Commission (EC) submitted a Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of undisclosed know-how and 
business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and 
disclosure (Commission Draft).7 After objections were raised by various 
industries, the Council of the European Union approved a general approach for 
establishing a new legal framework for the protection of trade, and a 
compromised text of the proposal was introduced to the public in May of 2014 
(Council Proposal).8  Later came another proposal for amendments9 and the 
 
1. STUDY ON TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION IN THE INTERNAL 
MARKET, at 2 (Apr. 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/13
0711_final-study_en.pdf.   
2. Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Antitrust and Trade Secrets: The U.S. and the EU Approach, 24 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 207, 210 (2008). 
3. Id. (“U.S. courts have held that a recipe for chocolate chip cookies, a pesticide formula, a 
scheme for an electronic board game, computer hardware design, some elements of computer software, 
and information relating to nontechnical aspects of business such as customer lists qualify for 
protection under trade secret laws.”).  Id. at 210.  
4. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).  
5. Id. The U.S. states that have not adopted the UTSA are Massachusetts and New York.  
6. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012). 
7. COUNCIL OF THE EUR. UNION, PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON THE PROTECTION OF UNDISCLOSED KNOW-HOW AND 
BUSINESS INFORMATION (TRADE SECRETS) AGAINST THEIR UNLAWFUL ACQUISITION, USE AND 
DISCLOSURE (Nov. 28, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/
131128_proposal_en.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION DRAFT]. 
8. GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL ON THE PROTECTION OF UNDISCLOSED KNOW-HOW AND BUSINESS 
INFORMATION (TRADE SECRETS) AGAINST THEIR UNLAWFUL ACQUISITION, USE AND DISCLOSURE, 
COD (2013) 0402 (May 19, 2014), http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209870
%202014%20INIT [hereinafter GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL]. 
9. This paper does not analyze the draft report of Constance Le Grip as of June 2015, seeking 
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legislative process is not yet finished. This paper will further discuss the 
Council Proposal as the latest draft of the EC Directive. 
The differences in the legal protection of trade secrets provided for by the 
EU Member States imply that trade secrets do not enjoy an equivalent level of 
protection10 in the EU, leading to “fragmentation of the internal market in this 
area.”11 Furthermore, current differences complicate the enforcement of 
protections for trade secrets in cases of cross-border infringement.12  Thus, the 
Council Proposal is intended to establish and harmonize the protection against 
misappropriation of trade secrets within the EU.13 
A. The Purpose of the Article 
This article is focused on applying the Council Proposal’s rules to the 
manufacturing industry, especially in relation to employees and business 
partners.  This article will address the most important provisions of the Council 
Proposal using hypotheticals and case law from the U.S. and the EU.  The vast 
majority of cases, however, will be U.S. cases as they are more instructive for 
this purpose.14 
 
to provide more respect for freedom of expression, media freedom, and protection of whistle-blowers. 
However, the European Parliament legal affairs approved this draft report on June 16, 2015, and 
gave “a mandate to start informal talks with the Council with a view to reaching a first-reading 
agreement.” See Trade Secrets: Freedom of Expression Must Be Protected, Say Legal Affairs MEPs, 
EUR. PARLIAMENT (June 6, 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/201
50615IPR66493/html/Trade-secrets-freedom-of-expression-must-be-protected-say-legal-affairs-
MEPs.  VOTING LIST ON THE DRAFT REPORT ON PROTECTION OF UNDISCLOSED KNOW-HOW AND 
BUSINESS INFORMATION (TRADE SECRETS) AGAINST THEIR UNLAWFUL ACQUISITION, USE AND 
DISCLOSURE, COD (2013) 0402 (June 15, 2015), https://polcms.secure.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/u
pload/1392a228-a9b1-4860-b725-a52325da631b/VL-2013_0402(COD)_Trade%20secrets_LZ_Le%
20Grip_final.pdf.  Legal Affairs – Draft reports, EUR. PARLIAMENT COMM., http://www.europarl.eur
opa.eu/committees/en/juri/draft-reports.html?ufolderComCode=JURI&ufolderLegId=8&ufolderId=0
0273&linkedDocument=true&urefProcYear=&urefProcNum=&urefProcCode (last visited Dec. 10, 
2015). 
10.  Similar to the U.S., in 1979 “[t]he UTSA was promulgated to address concerns about the 
‘uneven’ development of trade secret law and to combat the resulting ‘undue uncertainty concerning 
the parameters of trade secret protection, and the appropriate remedies for misappropriation of a trade 
secret.’” CDC Restoration & Const., LC v. Tradesmen Contractors, LLC, 274 P.3d 317, 329 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13–24–1 to 13–24–9 (West 2015).  
11.  GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at recital 7. 
12.  Roland Knaak, Annette Kur, & Reto M. Hilty, Comments of the Max Planck Institute for 
Innovation and Competition of 3 June 2014 on the Proposal of the European Commission for a 
Directive on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets) 
Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure 1, 2 (Max Planck Institute for Innovation & 
Competition Research Paper No. 14-11, 2014). 
13.  Andrzej Drzewiecki, Proposed EU Trade Secrets Directive: Shaping the New EU 
Legislation on the Protection of Trade Secrets, 75 ZESZYTY NAUKOWE POLITECHNIKI ŚLĄSKIEJ 19, 
20 (2014). 
14.  STUDY ON TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION IN THE 
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B. Trade Secrets’ Importance for the Manufacturing Sector 
Trade secrets are important to many different industries.15  A majority of 
the available empirical evidence on trade secrets focuses on the manufacturing 
sector, containing “numerous surveys of firms regarding the importance of 
trade secrets in appropriating the returns to innovation investments.”16  Trade 
secrets “are ranked as better protection mechanisms than patents, in particular 
with regard to process innovations.”17 
Very few empirical analyses of the use of litigation to seek remedies 
against trade secret theft have been published. Of the three studies 
identified, all relate to the trade secret litigation in the U.S. No 
economic or statistical analyses of trade secret litigation in [EU 
Member States] were identified as part of the economics literature 
survey. The US cases instructive in terms of the industries and types of 
misappropriation claims that may arise under EU member country trade 
secrets laws, and the role played by private parties in the protection of 
valuable trade secrets.18 
The bulk of “cases involve[] alleged misappropriators known by the trade 
secret owner,”19 along with the participation of either an employee or a business 
partner.20 
II. THE COUNCIL PROPOSAL FOR THE EU TRADE SECRETS DIRECTIVE 
A. The Scope 
Article 1 of the Council Proposal sets out the minimum rules on the 
protection against the unlawful acquisition, use, and disclosure of trade secrets.  
The EU Member States may introduce more far-reaching protection of trade 
secrets than those required in the Council Proposal, provided that there is full 
compliance with the specific mandatory rules of the Proposal.21  This means 
that the Council Proposal provides only minimum requirements, but not full 
harmonization regarding the protection of trade secrets within the EU.  In this 
 
INTERNAL MARKET, supra note 1, at 105.   
15.  Id. at 2. 
16.  Id.  
17.  Id.  
18.  Id. at 105.  
19.  Id. at 106. 
20.  Id.  
21.  Strict compliance is required with Articles 4, 5, Article 6(1), Article 7, the 2nd 
subparagraph of Article 8(1), Articles 8(3), 8(4), 9(2), Articles 10, 12 and Article 14(3) of the Proposal. 
COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, at arts. 4–6(1), 7, 8(1) para. 2, 8(3), 8(4), 9(2), 10, 12, 14(3).  
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author’s view, minimum harmonization can undermine the intended effect of 
the Council Proposal and “disturb the balance of the Council Proposal, the 
provisions of the [Proposal] must neither be undercut nor exceeded by the 
implementing national legislation.”22  Thus, the full harmonization of trade 
secret law would provide more effect and consistence within the European 
Union.23 
B. Definitions 
1. Trade Secret 
Article 2(1) of the Council Proposal provides the definition for trade 
secrets.24  Recital 8 of the Council Proposal explains that this “definition 
should . . . be constructed as to cover business information, technological 
information, and know-how where there is both a legitimate interest in keeping 
confidential and a legitimate expectation in the preservation of such 
confidentiality.”25  Article 2(1) of the Council Proposal states that trade secret 
is information that meets all of the following requirements: 
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise 
configuration and assembly of its components, generally known 
among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that 
normally deal with the kind of information in question; 
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; 
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the 
person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.26 
In brief, for information to be considered a trade secret, the Council 
Proposal requires three elements: (i) secrecy; (ii) commercial value; and (iii) 
reasonable protection.27 
 
22.  See generally Knaak, Kur, & Hilty, supra note 12, at 4. 
23.  Id.  
24.  Id. at 5; see COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 2(1). 
25.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, at recital 8. In comparison, the definition of trade secret 
under the UTSA is more specific:  
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program 
device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual 
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, 
and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy. 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4). 
26.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 2(1)(a)–(c).  
27.  Key ingredients of a trade secret include “the de facto secrecy of information and the 
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a. Requirement of Secrecy 
Article 2(1)(a) of the Council Proposal provides that the confidential 
information shall be “secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise 
configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or 
readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind 
of information in question.”28  In other words, secrecy shall comply with two 
requirements: (i) the secret shall be a body, precise configuration, or assembly 
of its components; and (ii) shall not be generally known among, or readily 
accessible to, persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of 
information.  An example of a body, precise configuration, or the assembly of 
its components could be a customer list29 or detailed instructions of a specialty 
beer brewing process.  An example of generally known information could be a 
situation where a beer brewing process in general is very well known to all 
brew masters from competing breweries.  Information that is “not readily 
accessible” could occur in a case where a beer manufacturing method is not 
only readily accessible to competitors, but also accessible to the employees of 
different departments (e.g. the information is not known only to specific 
employees of the beer brewing department or to the brew master alone).  
Nonetheless, “secrecy does not need to be absolute,”30 and it will be enough if 
“it would be difficult or costly for others who could exploit the information to 
acquire it without resort to wrongful conduct.”31  However, if an interested 
person can find or reach “the information without a great deal of sacrifice, the 
matter is public and cannot be considered a trade secret.”32  Lastly, the area of 
knowledge shall be limited to persons within the circles that normally deal with 
the kind of information in question.  For instance, the beer brewing process is 
very well known to every brew master at every brewery.  However, the general 
knowledge of the beer brewing process is typically not known to a professor of 
immigration law because the immigration law professor usually does not 
belong to the circle that generally deals with the beer brewing methods or 
processes. 
 
owner’s continued efforts to maintain this secrecy.”  Czapracka, supra note 2, at 234. 
28.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 2(1)(c).  
29.  See, e.g., Ecolaire Inc. v. Crissman, 542 F. Supp. 196, 205–06 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Am. 
Precision Vibrator Co. v. Nat’l Air Vibrator Co., 764 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), appeal 
stayed, 771 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); see also 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 
3:3 (2015). 
30.  Czapracka, supra note 2, at 225. 
31.  Id. at 225–26. 
32.  Id. at 234–35. 
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b. Requirement of Commercial Value 
Article 2(1)(b) of the Council Proposal addresses the second required 
element for information to be considered a trade secret, which requires that the 
information derive commercial value.33  Recent suggestions proposed as 
amendments to the Council Proposal seek to clarify commercial value with the 
words “actual or potential”34 commercial value.  U.S. law extends trade secrets 
to information that “afford[s] an actual or potential economic advantage over 
others”35 or to information that “derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential.”36  The commercial value of the information directly depends on the 
level of secrecy.  Once the secret is revealed, the commercial value of the 
information decreases or disappears.  For example, a highly creative marketing 
campaign of a new product line has a very high commercial effect, especially 
in its concentrated market (which is comprised of various competitors fighting 
between each other for the consumer).  Thus, once the information on the 
marketing campaign or new product leaks to a competitor, the value of the 
campaign decreases significantly, and this information is worthless once it is 
revealed to the public. 
c. Requirement of Reasonable Protection 
Article 2(1)(c) of the Council Proposal sets out the third element for 
information to be considered trade secret.  The information shall be “subject to 
reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of 
the information, to keep it secret.”37  This third element, in turn, consists of two 
sub-elements: (i) reasonable steps under the circumstances and (ii) that the 
person is lawfully in control of the information. 
i. Requirement of Reasonable Steps 
Reasonable steps, such as requiring employees to sign confidentiality 
 
33.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 2(1)(b).  
34.  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS, DRAFT REPORT ON THE 
PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL ON THE 
PROTECTION OF UNDISCLOSED KNOW-HOW AND BUSINESS INFORMATION (TRADE SECRETS) AGAINST 
THEIR UNLAWFUL ACQUISITION, USE AND DISCLOSURE, at 11, COM (2013) 0813 (Feb. 10, 2015), htt
p://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bCOMPA
RL%2bPE546.885%2b01%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN [hereinafter DRAFT REPORT]. 
35.  “A Trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other 
enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic 
advantage over others.’” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW. INST. 
1995).   
36.  Czapracka, supra note 2, at 223. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (2012).   
37.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 2(1)(c); GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, 
supra note 8, at art. 2(1)(c).  
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agreements that prohibit disclosing some process, method, or other important 
information, shall be taken to protect the information.  For example, the beer 
company can enter into non-disclosure and non-compete agreements with its 
employees, especially the brew master and scientists who are responsible for 
and familiar with the beer company’s unique brewing methods and processes.38  
Furthermore, it is important to keep these agreements with employees in a 
special locked room, on a special server, or in a folder protected with passwords 
or restricted access; although, it is not necessary to keep documents in a special 
bank vault. However, 
the ingredient that gives Coca-Cola its distinctive taste . . . has been 
tightly guarded since Coca-Cola was first invented and is known by 
only two persons within the Coca-Cola Company. The only written 
record of the secret formula is kept is a security vault . . . which can 
only be opened upon a resolution from the Company’s Board of 
Directors.39 
Nevertheless, it is enough to consider steps reasonable if the steps show that 
the person wants to protect the information.40  In other words, the efforts must 
 
38.   For more information about the unique method for creating pure cultures of yeast free from 
bacteria and wild yeast that was applied in the Carlsberg breweries for the first time in 1883, See 
generally Louis Pasteur and Carlsberg Cure the ‘Beer Disease,’ CARLSBERG GRP., http://www.carls
berggroup.com/Company/heritage/Research/Pages/Pasteur.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2015). 
39.  Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 (D. Del. 
1985).  
40.  See Com-Share, Inc. v. Comput. Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1234–35 (E.D. Mich. 
1971), aff’d, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972) (stating that “the utmost caution was used by plaintiff in 
protecting the secrecy of software. Each page of the listings embodying plaintiff’s systems contained 
‘Com-Share, Inc. Company Confidential.’ ‘Passwords,’ . . . are built into the systems to prevent 
unauthorized access. Magnetic tapes . . .  are kept locked when not in use. These protections have been 
built into the systems themselves, not only in order that no customer can have unauthorized access to 
any other customer’s data base or specialized technology, but also in order that no employee of the 
company itself can have unauthorized access to any system.”); see also Structural Dynamics Research 
Corp. v. Eng’g Mechs. Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1117 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (holding that the 
technical and business information was treated by plaintiff in a manner consistent with the preservation 
of its confidentiality. “[T]he confidential nature of development work was specifically called to each 
employee’s attention in his individual confidential disclosure agreement.” Defendants knew that 
information was confidential and proprietary to plaintiff.); see also Radium Remedies Co. v. Weiss, 
173 Minn. 342, 348 (1928) (stating that secrecy need not be total; depending on the circumstances, 
only partial or qualified secrecy will do); see also 1-1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE 
SECRETS § 1.04 (2015) (efforts to safeguard secrecy: “posting of warning or cautionary signs or using 
document legends[;] restricting visitors[;] maintaining internal secrecy by dividing the process by 
dividing the process into steps and separating the various departments on the several steps[;] using 
unnamed or coded ingredients[;] keeping secret substances and documents under lock[;] limiting 
access to computer materials by use of passwords to prevent unauthorized access and keeping magnetic 
tapes, flow charts, symbolic and source code under lock and key when not in use . . . . Industry-wide 
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be reasonable “under the circumstances to maintain secrecy.”41 
What would not be considered reasonable steps in this author’s view?  If 
important documents are forgotten by someone in a meeting room after 
negotiation meetings, or if signed agreements are left carelessly at a company’s 
reception or secretary desk that are not in a sealed envelope and do not provide 
notice that the information is “confidential,” such steps will not be considered 
as reasonable protection and does not show that the owner of these agreements 
cared to protect the information that could be learned from these agreements.42 
For instance, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Jostens v. National 
Computer Systems, Inc.43 illustrates the practical considerations to maintain 
secrecy.44  There, the plaintiff failed to ensure that its information remained 
private.45  Reasonable steps to keep the information secret would have met the 
requirements for trade secrets, 
but [plaintiff] had allowed tours of its plant, approved publication of an 
article describing the system, and failed to identify . . . [the] crucial 
elements of the potential secret.46 The Court compared this behavior 
with various forms of reasonable efforts, such as protecting sensitive 
information with passwords and explaining to employees which items 
are important secrets.47 
To the contrary, in duPont v. Christopher48 the “[plaintiff] had apparently 
not identified with any degree of clarity what parts of visible construction were 
secret.”49  The comments to the UTSA notes that “efforts required to maintain 
secrecy are those reasonable under circumstances.”50  Courts do not require that 
extreme and unduly expensive procedures be taken to protect trade secrets 
 
customs may be viewed as augmenting a trade secret owner’s efforts to protect secrecy.”). 
41.  See MINN. STAT ANN. § 325C.01, subdiv. 5 (West 2015). 
42.  See, e.g., Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 700 (Minn. 1982) 
(citing Pressure Sci., Inc. v. Kramer, 413 F. Supp. 618, 627–28 (D. Conn. 1976), aff’d, 551 F.2d 301 
(2d Cir. 1976)) (holding that “plaintiff’s failure to require all employees working in a supposedly 
confidential area to sign a nondisclosure agreement evidenced a fatal lack of concern for 
confidentiality”). 
43.  Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 700 (Minn. 1982). 
44.  C. HOWARD ANAWALT, IDEA RIGHTS: A GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 157–58 
(2011).  
45.  Id. at 159.  
46.  Id.  
47.  Id.  See Jostens., 318 N.W.2d at 694. 
48.  E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970). 
49.  ANAWALT, supra note 44, at 163. 
50.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, cmt. 5.  
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against flagrant industrial espionage.51  Under the UTSA, “reasonable use of a 
trade secret including controlled disclosure to employees and licensees is 
consistent with the requirement of relative secrecy.”52 
In the highly criticized Microsoft Corp. v. European Commission case,53 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated that solutions have been kept secret 
by Microsoft to preserve an artificial interoperability advantage.54  Interestingly 
enough, in this case the ECJ did not find that the technologies were trade secret 
as they were not novel,55 
in the sense that they already formed part of the state of the art or were 
obvious to persons skilled in the art, and, therefore, Microsoft was not 
entitled to remuneration . . . [M]inor improvements which would 
represent only a negligible value to the recipients of the interoperability 
information could not be regarded as innovative.56 
ii. Requirement for Person to Have Lawful Control over the Information 
A person shall have a lawful control over trade secret, however the Council 
Proposal does not provide further explanation of what lawful control is.  Article 
2(2) gives the definition of a trade secret holder as “any natural or legal person 
lawfully controlling a trade secret.”57  Undoubtedly, a trade secret holder can 
be the owner of trade secret, a licensee using secret information under a license, 
and a person that obtained the information by independent development or 
reverse engineering. 
In this instance, it is valuable to mention the recent U.S. case Mattel, Inc. 
v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., which addressed the rights of an employee to control 
product ideas.58  In this case, the dispute arose over the ownership of an idea 
for a new children’s doll created by the plaintiff’s former employee, the 
defendant, who then exploited the idea.59  The court held “that an assignment 
 
51.  E. I. duPont deNemours, 431 F.2d 1012. 
52.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, cmt. 5.  
53.  Case T-167/08, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000.  
54.  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, TRADE 
SECRETS, IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS 16 (Apr. 2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/
join/2014/493055/IPOL-JURI_NT%282014%29493055_EN.pdf.   
55.  But see Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Eng’g Mechs. Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 
1102, 1117 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (stating that “[a]n overwhelming majority of authorities on the subject 
have ruled that novelty and uniqueness are not a requirement for trade secret protection”). 
56.  See Case T-167/08, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000, para. 35. 
57.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 2(2). 
58.  Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended on denial of 
reh’g Oct. 21, 2010. 
59.  Id. at 907–08.  
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of ‘inventions’ in an employment contract may not include an assignment of 
ideas.  The employer would thus not have the rights to control product ideas of 
an employee, once the employee had moved to another company.”60 
2. “Infringing Goods” 
Article 2(1)(4) of the Council Proposal gives the definition of “infringing 
goods.” Infringing goods are the “goods whose design, quality, [functioning,] 
manufacturing process or marketing significantly benefits from trade secrets 
unlawfully acquired, used or disclosed.”61  In this author’s opinion, the 
definition of “infringing goods” is vague due to the words “significantly” and 
“quality.”  The evaluation of “significantly” or “quality” can result in many 
disputes regarding the appropriate interpretation of these words.  Recent 
proposals for amendments to the Council Proposal offer to clarify the definition 
of “infringing goods” by replacing the word “quality” with the word 
“characteristics” in “order to cover various aspects of the life of the product.”62  
This will  broaden the list of other characteristics in addition to the quality.63 
C. Acquisition, Use, and Disclosure 
1. Unlawful Acquisition, Use, and Disclosure 
Article 3(1) of the Council Proposal provides the rights to “trade secrets 
holders . . . to apply for measures . . . in order to prevent, or obtain redress for, 
the unlawful acquisition, use or disclosure of their trade secret.”64 Articles 3(2)–
(5) of the Council Proposal sets definitions of unlawful acquisition, use, or 
disclosure. 
 
a. Unlawful Acquisition 
Under Article 3(2) of the Council Proposal, 
[t]he acquisition of a trade secret without the consent of the trade secret 
holder shall be considered unlawful whenever carried out . . . by: 
(a) unauthorised [sic] access to or copy of any documents, objects, 
 
60.  See Stephen McJohn, Top Tens in 2010: Copyright and Trade Secret Cases, 9 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 325, 335 (2011); see generally Mattel, 616 F.3d 904; see generally 1-1 ROGER 
M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS (2011). 
61.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 2(1)(4).  
62.  DRAFT REPORT, supra note 34, at 16.  
63.  See also Knaak, Kur, & Hilty, supra note 12, at 7. 
64.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 3(1).  
SOSNOVA.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2017  1:34 PM 
2016] EU DIRECTIVE PROPOSAL: TRADE SECRETS 57 
 
materials, substances or electronic files, lawfully under the control 
of the trade secret holder, containing the trade secret or from which 
the trade secret can be deduced; . . . 
. . . 
(f) any other conduct which, under the circumstances, is considered 
contrary to honest commercial practices.65 
Here, an example of unlawful copying or appropriation of any documents 
may occur in a situation when an employee, who is thinking of or planning to 
leave the company, copies some files to his own computer or data storage 
devise.  As a current employee, the employee can copy some documents if he 
needs the documents directly for his job obligations, but, he is not allowed to 
use the documents or take them with him when he leaves the company if the 
copied information contains trade secrets owned by the company. 
The case, duPont v. Christopher66 is an example where an employee copied 
objects containing trade secrets or objects from which the trade secret could be 
deduced.  In that case, the Christophers, the defendants, were hired to take aerial 
photographs of the plaintiff’s plant and new construction site by an unknown 
third party.67  duPont was building a new plant and before it could build the 
roof over its highly-secret new process for producing methanol, the 
Christophers took aerial photographs of the new construction.68  Photographs 
of the duPont facility were taken and delivered to the third party.69  The court 
held that aerial photography is an improper method of discovering the trade 
secrets exposed during construction of the plant, and regardless of whether the 
flight was legal or illegal in that sense, the espionage was an improper means 
of discovering the trade secrets.70 
In Avery Dennison Corp. v. Four Pillars Enter. Co., an employee stole 
“Avery[’s] formulas and other confidential information for eight years and 
pass[ed] them on to [Four Pillars],71 which, in turn, modified Avery’s 
formulas,72 created new products, and saved significantly on research and 
streamlining its manufacturing process.”73  The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court decision about misappropriation of trade secrets.74  The court 
 
65.  Id. arts. 3(2)(a), 3(2)(f).  
66.  E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970). 
67.  Id. at 1013. 
68.  Id.  
69.  Id. at 1012–13, 1015.  
70.  Id. at 1012, 1017.  
71.  Avery Dennison Corp. v. Four Pillars Enters. Co., 45 F. App’x 479, 482 (6th Cir. 2002). 
72.  Id. at 486. 
73.  Id. at 487.   
74.  Id. at 480.  
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highlighted that even if a defendant may have altered a trade secret, this does 
not relieve it from liability.75 
The Council Proposal does not provide further explanation of what honest 
commercial practices means.  In this instance, the Paris Convention and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS 
Agreement) are helpful.76  In regards to conduct contrary to honest commercial 
practices, the court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. stated that trade secret 
law is driven by “the maintenance of standards of commercial ethics.77  ‘The 
necessity of good faith and honest, fair dealing, is the very life and spirit of the 
commercial world.’”78  The meaning of contrary honest commercial practices 
does not “extend to the use of protected information by third parties who 
obtained it in accordance with honest commercial practices.”79 
b. Unlawful Use or Disclosure 
Article 3(3) of the Council Proposal states the following: 
The use or disclosure of a trade secret shall be considered unlawful 
whenever carried out, without the consent of the trade secret holder . . . 
by a person who is found to meet any of the following conditions: 
(a) has acquired the trade secret unlawfully; 
(b) is in breach of a confidentiality agreement or any other duty to 
maintain secrecy of the trade secret; 
(c) is in breach of a contractual or any other duty to limit the use of 
the trade secret.80 
Article 3(3) of the Council Proposal stipulates that use or disclosure is 
unlawful if the use occurs without the trade secret holder’s consent, if acquired 
 
75.  Id. at 487 (citing Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1239 
(8th Cir. 1994)).  
76.  Article 10bis of the Paris Convention and in art. 39, § 2, n. 10 to the TRIPS Agreement, 
“contrary to honest commercial practices” is defined under note 10 as “at least practices such as breach 
of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed 
information by third parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such practices 
were involved in the acquisition.” Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, opened 
for signature Mar. 20, 1883, art. 10bis, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised 1967); Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Result of the Uruguay 
Rounds, 33 I.L.M. 83, § 7, art. 39, § 2 n.10,  (1994); see also Czapracka, supra note 2, at 272. 
77.  Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
78.  Id. at 481–82. 
79.  Czapracka, supra note 2, at 210. 
80.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 3(3)(a)–(c).  
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unlawfully, if the use or disclosure breaches a confidentiality agreement, or if 
the use or disclosure breaches some other contractual duty to minimize the use 
or disclosure of the trade secret.81  Regarding unlawful use, duPont v. 
Christopher82 and Avery v. Four Pillars83 are informative.  In both cases, third 
parties used trade secrets that were acquired unlawfully and were acquired 
without the trade secret holders’ permission.84  Unlawful use or disclosure and 
breaching a confidentiality agreement usually happen between an employer and 
an employee,85 agency or agencies, or contractors that are supposed to provide 
certain services. 
Unlawful acquisition can also occur when there is a breach of a contractual 
or any other duty to limit the use of the trade secret.  This can happen, for 
example, when an information technology administrator who is responsible for 
the protection of the company’s server from unauthorized use fails to do so, or 
when a trade-secret licensee breaches his obligation to control or limit the use 
of the trade secret.  The requirements of Article 3(2) and 3(3), in regards to 
unlawful acquisition, use, or disclosure of trade secrets apply to situations when 
the person, at the time of acquisition, use, or disclosure of trade secrets should 
have known that the trade secret was obtained unlawfully.86  “The . . . 
production, offering or placing on the market of infringing goods, or import, 
export or storage of infringing goods . . . shall also be considered unlawful use 
of a trade secret” when the person carrying out such activities knew or should 
have known, under the circumstances, that the trade secret was used 
unlawfully.87 
An example of unlawful use could be a situation where a beer company 
knowingly uses a unique beer yeast formula stolen from a competitor for its 
own beer production. 
2. Lawful Acquisition, Use, Disclosure and Exceptions 
Article 4 of the Council Proposal provides rules for lawful acquisition, use, 
and the disclosure of trade secrets and exceptions. 
Article 4(1) of the Council Proposal states 
The acquisition of trade secrets shall be considered lawful when 
 
81.  Id. 
82.  E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).  
83.  Avery Dennison Corp. v. Four Pillars Enters. Co., 45 F. App’x 479 (6th Cir. 2002). 
84.  See generally E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 431 F.2d 1012; Avery Dennison Corp., 45 F. 
App’x 479.  
85.  Avery Dennison Corp., 45 F. App’x 479. 
86.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, arts. 3(2), 3(3).  
87.  Id. arts. 3(45)–(5). 
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obtained by any of the following means: 
(a) independent discovery or creation; 
(b) observation, study, disassembly or test of a product or object 
that has been made available to the public or that it is lawfully in 
the possession of the acquirer of the information; . . . 
. . . 
(c) any other practice which, under the circumstances, is in 
conformity with honest commercial practices.88 
a. Independent Development 
Article 4(1)(a) of the Council Proposal states that independent development 
of some information shall be considered lawful.89  This means that “a person 
who independently discovers, [creates,] or develops information identical to 
another’s trade secrets without relying on confidentially received information 
or improper means incurs no liability.”90 
b. Observation or Study of Publicly Available Product                                 
or Being in Lawful Possession 
Article 4(1)(b) of the Council Proposal describes two situations: (i) 
“observation, study, disassembly or test of a product or object that has been 
made available to the public or  [(ii)] that it is lawfully in the possession of the 
acquirer of the information”91 who is free from any legally valid duty to limit 
the acquisition of the trade secret.92 
i. Reverse Engineering 
As mentioned above, Article 4(1)(b) of the Council Proposal consists of 
two elements: activity (i.e. observation, study, disassembly, or test) and domain 
(i.e. public domain).  In order to comply with these two elements, the person 
who observed, studied, dissembled, or tested the product must prove that the 
product in question was available in the public domain.  In other words, the 
person must have easily acquired the information or the information was 
completely unprotected.93 The Council Proposal states that 
 
88.  Id. art. 4(1).  
89.  Id. art. 4(1)(a).  
90.  DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 239 (2d ed. 
LexisNexis 2011). 
91.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 4(1)(b).  
92.  Id. art. 4(1)(b).  
93.  CHISUM ET AL., supra note 90, at 240. 
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[i]n the interest of innovation and to foster competition, the provisions 
of this Directive should not create any exclusive right on the know-how 
or information protected as trade secrets. Thus, independent discovery 
of the same know-how or information remains possible. Reverse 
engineering of a lawfully acquired product is a lawful means of 
acquiring information.94 
The Council Proposal fails to give further explanation of reverse 
engineering.  In Kewanee v. Bicron, reverse engineering was defined as 
“discovery by fair and honest means such as independent invention, [or] 
accidental disclosure.”95  There, the court explained that “trade secret [law] 
does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means such as 
independent invention, accidental disclosure, or ‘reverse engineering.’”96  In 
Learning Curve Toys v. PlayWood Toys, the court stated that “reverse 
engineering can defeat a trade secret claim, but only if the product could have 
been properly acquired by others.”97  There, PlayWood disclosed its concept to 
Learning Curve in the context of a confidential relationship.98  The court stated 
“Learning Curve had no legal authority to reverse engineer the prototype that 
it received in confidence.”99  As Professor Milgrim stated: 
A potent distinction exists between a trade secret which will be 
disclosed if and when the product in which it is embodied is placed on 
sale, and a ‘trade secret’ embodied in a product which has been placed 
on sale, which product admits of discovery of the ‘secret’ upon 
inspection, analysis, or reverse engineering . . .100 Until disclosed by 
sale the trade secret should be entitled to protection.101 
Although a secret may be easy to replicate or duplicate, this does not negate 
the information being protected as a trade secret prior to that time.102  Comment 
1 to the UTSA describes reverse engineering as: “starting with the known 
product and working backward to find the method by which it was developed.  
The acquisition of the known product must also occur by fair and honest means, 
 
94.  GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at recital 10.  
95.  Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
96.  Id. 
97.  Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 730 (7th Cir. 2003). 
98.  Id.  
99.  Id. 
100.  1-1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.05[4] (2002). 
101.  Id. 
  102. RUDOLF CALLMANN, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND 
MONOPOLIES § 14.15 (4th ed. 2003). 
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such as purchase of item on the open market for reverse engineering to be 
lawful.”103 
Article 4(b)(ii) of the Council Proposal does not provide an explanation of 
a situation where a trade secret has been acquired lawfully, but where the 
acquirer has no legal duty to limit the publication or use of the trade secret.  
Some examples can be found in the comments to UTSA, for instance (i) 
“discovery under a license from the owner of trade secret”104 or (ii) “obtaining 
the trade secret from published literature.”105  Another example of lawful 
possession would be “innocent receipt,” mentioned in the UTSA and the 
Restatement (First) of Torts.106  “Innocent receipt may occur through mistake 
or through a third party’s misappropriation.”107  It is important to mention that 
“[a] person who obtains another’s secret through neither improper means nor a 
confidential relationship has no duty prior to receiving notice of the owner’s 
rights in the secret.”108  Additionally, “[e]ven after receiving notice, remedies 
may be limited (UTSA) or liability nonexistent (Restatement) if the defendant 
has in good faith paid value for the secret or has otherwise detrimentally relied 
on the right to use or disclose the secret.”109 
c. Other Practices in Conformity with Honest Commercial Practices 
Lastly, in regards to Article 4(1)(c), the Council Proposal states that the 
acquisition of trade secrets shall be considered lawful when obtained by “any 
other practice which, under the circumstances, is in conformity with honest 
commercial practices.”110  The Council Proposal does not expressly provide the 
definition of honest commercial practices.  However, the Council Proposal 
describes dishonest practices misappropriating trade secrets “such as theft, 
unauthorised [sic] copying, economic espionage, breach of confidentiality 
requirements, whether from within or from outside of the Union.”111  Further, 
the Council Proposal states 
[t]hat while an element of dishonest behavior would be needed, no 
intentionality or gross negligence criteria should be required for the 
unlawful conduct to exist in the case of primary infringers . . . in 
 
103.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, cmt. 2.  
104.  Id. § 1, cmt. 3.  
105.  Id. § 1, cmt. 5. 
106.  CHISUM ET AL., supra note 90, at 237. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id.  
109.  Id.  
110.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 4(1)(c).  
111.  Id. at recital 3. 
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principle a knowledge criterion should be required in the case of passive 
receivers of information (third parties) for their conduct to be 
unlawful. . . .112 
3.  Exceptions for Acquisition, Use, and the Disclosure of Trade Secrets 
Articles 4(1a) and 4(2) of the Council Proposal provides exception rules for 
acquisition, use, and the disclosure of trade secrets. 
a. Requirements of EU or National Law of EU Member States 
Under Article 4(1)(a) of the Council Proposal, “[t]he acquisition, use and 
disclosure of trade secrets shall be considered lawful to the extent that such 
acquisition, use or disclosure is required or allowed by the Union or EU 
Member States national laws.”113  In other words, the acquisition, use, and 
disclosure of trade secrets shall be considered lawful if pursuant to the laws of 
the EU or EU Member States. 
b. Freedom of Expression, Revelation of Illegal Activity for the Public 
Interest, and Exercise of Employees’ Representative Functions 
Article 4(2) of the Council Proposal states the following: 
Member States shall ensure that there shall be no entitlement to the 
application for the measures, procedures and remedies provided for in 
this Directive when the alleged acquisition, use or disclosure of the 
trade secret was carried out in any of the following cases: 
(a) for making legitimate use of the right to freedom of expression 
and information; 
(b) for the purpose of revealing an applicant’s misconduct, 
wrongdoing or illegal activity, provided that the alleged acquisition, 
use or disclosure of the trade secret was necessary for such 
revelation and that the respondent acted in the public interest; 
(c) the trade secret was disclosed by workers to their representatives 
as part of the legitimate exercise of their representative functions, 
[provided that such disclosure was necessary for that exercise]; . . . 
. . . 
(e) for the purpose of protecting a legitimate interest [recognized by 
Union or national law].114 
 
112.  GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at 4. 
113.  Id. art. 4(1a).  
114.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 4(2). 
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Thus, Article 4(2) basically provides the following exceptions: 
(1) the right to the freedom of expression and information; 
(2) revelation of illegal activity for the public interest; 
(3) exercise of employees’ representative functions; and 
(4) protection of legitimate interests recognized in EU Member States 
national or EU law. 
i. The Right to the Freedom of Expression and Information 
The Council Proposal states the “[m]edia often make public . . . information 
considered to be a trade secret by another party [when] the publication of [such 
information] could be of public interest.”115  Thus, the measures “should not 
restrict the exercise of the freedom of expression and information (which 
encompasses media freedom and pluralism as reflected in Article 11 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union).”116  The “[d]irective 
must not pose either a de jure or a de facto threat to journalists’ ability to carry 
out their work or to the exercise by any person of their freedom of expression, 
on the basis of legal certainty and in accordance with national and EU law.”117 
ii. Revelation of Illegal Activity for the Public Interest 
Article 4(2)(b) of the Council Proposal states that the person that allegedly 
acquired, used, or disclosed trade secret is exempted from liability, if (i) the 
purpose of revealing the trade secret is misconduct, wrongdoing, or illegal 
activity; (ii) the “acquisition, use or disclosure of the trade secret was necessary 
for such revelation[;] and [(iii)] that the [person] acted in the public interest.”118 
Protection of trade secrets should not extend to cases where the “disclosure of 
a trade secret serves the public interest in so far as the information is relevant 
to revealing misconduct or wrongdoing.”119  For example, it is important that 
measures do not constrain whistleblowing activity.120  This principle could be 
re-drafted more broadly as “whistle-blowers should be protected, provided that 
they are acting in the public interest.”121 
a. “Luxleaks” Tax Avoidance Case and Protection of Whistle-Blowers 
The recent “Luxleaks” scandal on tax avoidance in Luxemburg revealed 
 
115.  GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at recital 10b.  
116.  Id. 
117.  DRAFT REPORT, supra note 34, at 11. 
118.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 4(2)(b).  
119.  GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at recital 12. 
120.  Id. 
121.  DRAFT REPORT, supra note 34, at 10. 
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that hundreds of multinational companies122 had secured secret deals in 
Luxembourg.123 In December of 2014,124 Antoine Deltour, a former 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) employee, was accused of leaking tax 
secrets,125 breaching confidentiality, and violating trade secrets.126  Deltour 
copied a large number of files at PwC’s Luxembourg office the day before he 
quit in 2010.127  He explained that he acted because of his convictions, based 
on his beliefs, and not to appear in the media.128  The leaked documents were 
published on the internet on November 5th and December 9th of 2014 by the 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ).129 
The leaked documents included deals negotiated by PwC on behalf of 
hundreds of corporate clients.130  To qualify the companies for tax relief, PwC 
tax advisers helped create financial strategies to shift profits from one part of a 
corporation to another in order to reduce or eliminate taxable income.131  The 
ICIJ identified companies, including PepsiCo Inc. and Walt Disney Co., who 
were granted so-called tax rulings by Luxembourg that allowed some 
corporations to effectively lower the amount of corporate taxes owed to less 
than one percent.132  The ICIJ has created a database of 548 tax rulings that 
 
122.  “The documents, known as the ‘Luxleaks’ showed that more than 300 companies, 
including PepsiCo Inc, AIG Inc and Deutsche Bank AG, secured secret deals from Luxembourg to 
slash their tax bills.” Henriette Jacobsen, Vestager Says Will Use “Luxleaks” Documents in EU Tax 
Probe, EURACTIV (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/vestager-
says-will-use-luxleaks-documents-eu-tax-probe-310189; see also Leslie Wayne, et. al., Leaked 
Documents Expose Global Companies’ Secret Tax Deals in Luxembourg, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC 
INTEGRITY (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks/leaked-documents-expose-
global-companies-secret-tax-deals-luxembourg.  
123.  Jacobsen, supra note 122; Wayne, et al., supra note 122.  
124.  Stephanie Bodoni, Ex-PwC Auditor Charged in Leaks of Luxembourg Tax Cases, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-15/ex-pwc-
auditor-charged-in-leaks-of-luxembourg-tax-cases; see also Simon Bowers, World Unites to Decry 
Prosecution of Source Behind LuxLeaks Tax Scandal, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/23/prosecution-source-luxleaks-tax-scandal-letter-
luxembourg-auditor-antoine-deltour. 
125.  Bodoni, supra note 124; Bowers, supra note 124.   
126.  Neil Chenoweth, LuxLeaks Accused Antoine Deltour: “I Did My Duty”, AFR.COM  
(Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.afr.com/news/policy/tax/luxleaks-accused-antoine-deltour-idid-my-
duty-20141216-128m6w. 
127.  Id.  
128.  Matthew Dalton, Suspected LuxLeaks Leaker: I Am Part of a Bigger Moment, WALL ST. 
J. (Dec. 15, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2014/12/15/suspected-luxleaks-leaker-i-am-part-of-
a-bigger-movement/.  
129.  Another Ex-PwC Employee Charged in Luxembourg Tax Leaks, MNE TAX (Jan. 24, 
2015), http://mnetax.com/another-ex-pwc-employee-charged-luxembourg-tax-leaks-6450. 
130.  Wayne et. al., supra note 122.  
131.  Id.   
132.  Bodoni, supra note 124. 
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have been approved by Luxembourg officials with a stamped and signed 
confirmation letter.133  The files cover the period from 2003 to 2011, and 
include only those rulings that bear evidence.134  The ICIJ published a review 
of 28,000 pages of confidential documents135 regarding companies that have 
enjoyed effective tax rates of less than one percent on the profits they have 
shuffled into Luxembourg.136  The ICIJ created this database with scanned 
documents that are completely publicly available.137  The accusations currently 
against Deltour are made under Luxemburg law138 and hold a possible 
imprisonment term of five years.139 The application of the Council Proposal’s 
principles on the exemption of liability of a person that acted in the public’s 
interest (possibly as a whistleblower) with the purpose of revealing illegal 
activity would give Deltour the hope on fair trial under harmonized EU law on 
trade secrets. 
iii. Exercise of Employees’ Representative Functions 
Recital 17 of Council Proposal states that 
[a]cquisition and disclosure of trade secrets in the context of the 
exercise of the rights of workers representatives to information, 
consultation and participation in accordance with the [European] Union 
and EU Member States national law or practices, and the collective 
defense of the interests of workers and employers, including co-
determination, is also excluded from the scope of unlawful acquisition, 
without prejudice of any duty of confidentiality imposed on the 
recipients of information so acquired.140 
This exclusion also applies to acquiring or the disclosure of a trade secret 
while performing statutory audits.141 
 
 
133.  Galizia et. al., Explore the Documents: Luxembourg Leaks Database, THE 
INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.icij.org/project/lux
embourg-leaks/explore-documents-luxembourg-leaks-database. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Wayne et al., supra note 122. 
136.  Jacobsen, supra note 122.  
137.  Galizia et. al., supra note 133.  
138.  Bowers, supra note 124. 
139.  Stephanie Bodoni & Tom Mackenzie, The Quiet Man Who Made Big Trouble for Little 
Luxembourg, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-
23/the-quiet-man-who-made-big-trouble-for-little-luxembourg. 
140.  GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at recital 10a. 
141.  Id. 
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iv. Protection of Legitimate Interests Recognized in EU Member States 
National Law or EU Law 
The acquisition, use, or disclosure of trade secrets whenever imposed or 
permitted by law should not be treated as unlawful.  Consequently, “the 
acquisition or disclosure of a trade secret by administrative or judicial 
authorities for the performance of their duties should be lawful.”142 
Additionally, 
disclosure by Union’s institutions and bodies or EU Member States 
national public authorities of business-related information they hold 
pursuant to the obligations of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001143 . . . or 
to other rules on the public access to documents or on the transparency 
obligations of national public authorities should not be considered 
unlawful disclosure of a trade secret.144 
v. Privilege in U.S. Law as Protection from Liability 
In the U.S. Restatement (First) of Torts,145 the “liability only exists where 
use or disclosure is not privileged by the general need to promote a public 
interest or by individual’s need to defend against an infringement charge.”146  
This privilege applies in cases where a witness is compelled by law to disclose 
trade secrets in testimony.147  However, this testimonial privilege does not 
protect a witness from liability for breach of contract based on voluntary 
disclosure. 148 The court in ITT Telecom v. Dooley held that the privilege 
exception is inapplicable to the defendant’s voluntary disclosures that allegedly 
violated his non-disclosure agreement.149 
4. Limitation Period 
a. Maximum Six Years for the EU 
Six years is the maximum period for substantive claims or for bringing 
 
142.  Id. 
143.  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 
2001 regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents, 2001 
O.J. (L 145) 43.  
144.  GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at recital 10a. 
145.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §757 (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
146.  CHISUM ET AL., supra note 90, at 240; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §757, 
cmt. d. 
147.  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. d.  
148.  CHISUM ET AL., supra note 90, at 240. See ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley, 262 
Cal. Rptr. 773, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
149.  ITT Telecom Products Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. at 783. 
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actions for the application of the measures, procedures, and remedies under 
Article 7 of the Council Proposal.150  However, this does not necessarily mean 
that all EU Member States will include this maximum period in their national 
laws when implementing the Proposal.  The Council Proposal provides only 
minimal harmonization, and EU Member States are free to set different 
limitation periods not exceeding six years.151  In this author’s view, this can 
result in different limitation periods for bringing claims and application of the 
measures among EU Member States.  For example, if Finland set a two-year 
limitation period, but Spain sets a six-year limitation period, corporations that 
have subsidiaries in these countries will be faced with different limitation 
periods for bringing claims for trade secrets violations.  Furthermore, the 
Council Proposal provides no limitations for EU Member States to decide when 
the limitation period will begin to run, and under which circumstances the 
limitation period will be interrupted or suspended.  In this author’s opinion, the 
full harmonization of limitation periods throughout the common EU market 
would be more appropriate. 
b. UTSA: Statute of Limitations 
Under the UTSA, the “action for misappropriation must be brought within 
[three] years after the misappropriation is discovered or by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have been discovered[,]” and for this purpose, “a 
continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim.”152 
5. Abusive Litigation 
The Council Proposal stipulates that safeguards shall be applied against the 
abuse of measures, procedures, and remedies.153 
EU Member States shall ensure that [courts] . . . apply appropriate 
measures as provided for in national law, where a claim concerning the 
unlawful acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret is manifestly 
unfounded and the applicant is found to have initiated the legal 
proceedings abusively or in bad faith.154 
These measures may include awarding the respondent damages, imposing 
on the applicant sanctions, or ordering information regarding the decision to be 
 
150.  GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, supra note 8, art. 7. 
151.  Id. at 6, and art. 1.  
152.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 6.   
153.  GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, supra note 8, art. 6(1).  
154.  Id. art. 6(2).  
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disseminated.155 
In Akzo Chemie v. Commission, the CJEU noted that a “party who has 
submitted a complaint may not . . . be given access to documents containing 
business secrets[, otherwise this] would lead to the unacceptable consequence 
that [it] might be inspired to lodge a complaint . . . solely in order to gain access 
to its competitors’ business secrets.”156 
6. Preservation of Confidentiality in the Course of Legal Proceedings 
Pursuant to Article 8 of the Council Proposal, the confidentiality of trade 
secrets shall be maintained in the course of legal proceedings.157  This 
obligation shall remain in force after the conclusion of legal proceedings.158  
However, such obligation will cease to exist if “(a) the alleged trade secret is 
found [by a final decision] not to fulfill the requirements [for trade secret, 
or] . . . (b) where over time, the information in question become generally 
known.”159 
a. Specific Measures 
The EU Member States must ensure that courts take measures to preserve 
confidentiality on a duly reasoned application by a party or on their own 
initiatives.160  The Council Proposal’s minimum requirement for measures 
grants the option 
(a) to restrict access to any document containing trade secrets or alleged 
trade secrets . . . to a limited number of persons, provided that at least 
one person from each party, its respective lawyer or representative to 
the proceedings and court officials are given full access to such 
document; 
(b) to restrict access to hearings, when trade secrets or alleged trade 
secrets may be disclosed, and their corresponding records or transcript, 
to a limited number of persons, provided that at least one person from 
each party, its respective lawyer or representative to the proceedings 
and court officials are given full access to such hearing, records or 
transcript; [and] 
(c) to make available to third parties a non-confidential version of any 
judicial decision, in which the passages containing trade secrets have 
 
155.  Id. art. 6. 
156.  Case 53/85, AKZO Chemie BV & AKZO Chemie UK Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1986 E.C.R. I-
01965, para. 28.  
157.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, at art. 8.  
158.  Id. 
159.  GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, supra note 8, art. 8(1)(a)–(b).  
160.  Id. art. 8(2). 
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been removed.161 
Courts of EU Member States 
[S]hall take into account the need to ensure the rights to an effective 
remedy and to a fair trial, the legitimate interests of the parties and, 
where appropriate of third parties, and any potential harm for either of 
the parties, and where appropriate third parties, resulting from the 
granting or rejection of such access.162 
The Council Proposal expresses the willingness to provide more flexibility 
to the appropriate judicial authorities when considering the need to issue 
injunctions and other corrective measures.163 
b. UTSA: Preservation of Secrecy 
In regards of the requirements for the preservation of secrecy for courts 
dealing with trade secret cases, the UTSA states that: 
court[s] shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by 
reasonable means, which may include granting protective orders in 
connection with discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, 
sealing the records of the action, and ordering any person involved in 
the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret without prior court 
approval.164 
Comparing with Council Proposal, the text of the UTSA provides a briefer 
description of the requirements for the preservation of secrecy, but gives 
specific and helpful examples.165 
7. Provisional and Precautionary Measures 
Article 9 of the Council Proposal provides the rights of a trade secret holder 
to order the provisional and precautionary measures against the alleged 
infringer.  These measures include: 
(a) the cessation of or . . . the prohibition of the use or disclosure of the 
trade secret . . .; 
 
161.  Id. art. 8(2)(a)–(c).  
162.  Id. art. 8(3).   
163.  Id. at 5. 
164.   Id. 
165.   UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 5.  
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(b) the prohibition to produce, offer, place on the market or use 
infringing goods, or import, export or store infringing goods for 
those purposes; 
(c) the seizure or delivery of the suspected infringing goods, including 
imported goods, so as to prevent their entry into or circulation 
within the [EU] market.166 
Alternatively, courts may apply “the continuation of the alleged unlawful 
acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret subject to the lodging of 
guarantees intended to ensure the compensation of the trade secret holder.”167 
In the U.S., injunctions during discovery and trial are common.168  Since 
public disclosure of a trade secret terminates its protectability, the threat of 
disclosure, which can happen at any moment, constitutes irreparable injury.169 
8. Injunctions and Corrective Measures 
Injunctive and corrective measures are provided for in Article 11 of the 
Council Proposal.170  The Council Proposal also highlights the global nature of 
trade in which requiring an injunction is the prohibition of importing infringing 
goods into the EU.171 
a. Injunctive Measures 
Injunctive measures are 
(a) the cessation of or . . . the prohibition of the use or disclosure of the 
trade secret;  
(b) the prohibition to produce, offer, place on the market or use 
infringing goods, or import, export or store infringing goods for those 
purposes; [and] 
 
 
 
166.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 9(1)(a)–(c); GENERAL APPROACH TO THE 
PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at art. 9(1)(a)–(c).  
167.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art 9(2); GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, 
supra note 8, at art. 9(2).  
168.  See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 90, at 242 & n.296 (citing Salomon v. Hertz, 40 N.J. Eq. 
400 (Ch. 1886) (issuing a “preliminary injunction for technical business information”)); Dekar Indus., 
Inc. v. Bissett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970)).   
169.  CHISUM ET. AL., supra note 90, at 242, n.298 (Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 
613 F.3d 102, 119 (3d Cir. 2010) (issuing a preliminary injunction enjoining former executive from 
working for competitor)). 
170.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 11; GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, 
supra note 8, at art. 11. 
171.  GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at recital 17. 
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(c) the adoption of the appropriate corrective measures with regard to 
the infringing goods.172 
For example, an injunctive measure, which is the cessation, the prohibition, 
or the disclosure of the trade secret, can be applied in a case where a competitor 
recruits executive or key employee with intimate knowledge of the company.  
For example, Brewery “B,” a competitor, hires a marketing director with 
intimate knowledge of Brewery “A’s” strategic marketing plans. In this case, 
Brewery “A” can argue that any decision the marketing director would make in 
his new position would inevitably be influenced by his knowledge of Brewery 
“A’s” plans.  This type of injunction is being used in the U.S. and is based on 
the “inevitability” of disclosure,173 which can result from a previous 
employment relationship.174  In a similar U.S. case, PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 
the court approved an injunction and prevented the executive from taking a new 
position for the period of six months.175  There, PepsiCo, Inc. sought a 
preliminary injunction against a former employee, William Redmond, and the 
employee’s new employer, the Quaker Oats Company, in order to prevent 
Redmond from disclosing PepsiCo trade secrets in his new job with Quaker and 
from taking on any duties relating to beverage pricing, distribution, and 
marketing.176  Other U.S. courts, however, have rejected the concept of 
“inevitable disclosure” as insufficient to justify an injunction.177 The UTSA 
provides the possibility to enjoin actual or threatened misappropriation.178 
b. Corrective Measures 
The Council Proposal provides corrective measures, which include: 
(b) recall of the infringing goods from the market;  
(c) depriving the infringing goods of their infringing quality; 
 
172.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 11(a)–(c); GENERAL APPROACH TO THE 
PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at art. 11.  
173.  CHISUM ET AL., supra note 90, at 242. 
174.  See Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., 613 F.3d at 102 (issuing a preliminary injunction enjoining 
former executive from working for competitor). 
175.  PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995). 
176.  Id. at 1263; see also Nucor Corp. v. Bell, No. 2:06-CV-02972-DCN, 2008 WL 9894350, 
at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2008) (holding that the former employee was enjoined from participating in 
competitor’s production of steel). 
177.  See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine did not bar employee from working for competitor); Kelly Servs., 
Inc. v. Marzullo, 591 F. Supp. 2d 924 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (finding that “company’s allegations of 
“inevitable disclosure” were insufficient to justify injunction to preclude former employee from 
violating confidentiality and nonsolicitation agreement”). 
178.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2.  
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(d) destruction of the infringing goods or . . . withdrawal from the 
market, provided that such measure does not undermine the protection 
of the trade secret in question; 
(e) the destruction of all or part of any document, object, material, 
substance or electronic file containing or implementing the trade secret 
or, where appropriate, the delivery up to the applicant of all or part of 
those documents, objects, materials, substances and electronic files.179 
Corrective measures shall be carried out at the expense of the infringer 
unless there are particular reasons for not doing so, and without prejudice to 
any damages that may be due to the trade secret holder. 
c. Injunction as the Prohibition of Importing Infringing Goods in the EU 
As mentioned before, the Council Proposal highlights the global nature of 
trade that requires an injunction as “the prohibition of importing [infringing] 
goods into the [European] Union or storing them for the purposes of offering 
or placing them on the market.”180 
d. Duration of Injunctions 
Under the second paragraph of Article 12(1), the duration of the injunction 
shall be sufficient “to eliminate any commercial or economic advantage that 
the infringer could have derived from the unlawful acquisition, use or 
disclosure of the trade secret.”181  Injunctions shall be “revoked or otherwise 
cease to have effect, upon request of respondent if in the meantime the 
information in question no longer fulfils [sic] the conditions [of trade secret] . . . 
for reasons that cannot be attributed to the respondent.”182  Similar conditions 
regarding the duration of injunctions are stated in the UTSA.183  Hence, the 
perpetual injunction is possible taking into account the unlimited duration for 
the protection of trade secrets.184 
9. Pecuniary Compensation 
Under Article 12 of the Council Proposal, pecuniary measures can be 
applied instead of injunctions or corrective measures to the person that in good 
 
179.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 11(2)(b)–(e). 
180.  Id. at recital 17; GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, supra note 8, recital 17. 
181.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 12(1), ¶ 2; GENERAL APPROACH TO THE 
PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at art. 12(1), ¶ 2.  
182.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 12(2); GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, 
supra note 8, at art. 12(2).  
183.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2.  
184.  CHISUM ET AL., supra note 90, at 244. 
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faith received trade secret without knowledge of its unlawful nature or origin.185  
In order to avoid situations when the corrective measures or injunctions could 
cause disproportionate harm to that latter person, the pecuniary compensation 
may awarded to the injured party as an alternative measure, 
if all the following conditions are met: 
(a) the person concerned at the time of use or disclosure neither 
knew nor had reason . . . to know that the trade secret was obtained 
from another person who was using or disclosing the trade secret 
unlawfully; 
(b) execution of the measures in question would cause that person 
disproportionate harm; [and] 
(c) pecuniary compensation to the injured party appears reasonably 
satisfactory.186 
However, the “pecuniary compensation shall not exceed the amount of 
royalties . . . which would have been due, had that person requested 
authorisation [sic] to use the trade secret . . . for the period of time for which 
use of the trade secret could have been prohibited.”187 
10. Damages 
Article 13 of the Council Proposal provides the obligation to EU Member 
States to ensure that courts “order the infringer[s] who knew or ought to have 
known that he or she was engaging in unlawful acquisition, disclosure or use 
of a trade secret, to pay the trade secret holder damages commensurate to the 
actual prejudice suffered.”188 
a. Employee’s Liability May be Limited 
EU Member States, in accordance with their national law, may restrict the 
liability for damages of employees for the unlawful acquisition, use, or 
disclosure of a trade secret of the employer when they act without intent. 
 
185.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 12(3)(a); GENERAL APPROACH TO THE 
PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at art. 12(3).  
186.  GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, supra note 8, art. 12(3)(a)–(c); see generally 
COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 12(3)(a)–(c). 
187.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 12(3); GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, 
supra note 8, art. 12(3), para. 2.  
188.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 13(1); GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, 
supra note 8, art. 13(1).  
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b. Factors for Setting Damages and Lump Sum as Alternative 
When deciding the amount of damages, courts “shall take into account all 
appropriate factors, such as [i] the negative economic consequences, including 
lost profits . . . [ii] any unfair profits made by the infringer and, in appropriate 
cases, elements other than economic factors, such as moral prejudice caused to 
the trade secret holder.”189  Alternatively, courts may “set the damages as a 
lump sum on the basis of elements such as, at a minimum, the amount of 
royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested 
authorisation [sic] to use the trade secret in question.”190 
c. Amount of Damages vs. Amount of Pecuniary Compensation 
The principles set out in the last sentence of Article 12(3), pecuniary 
compensation, for “good faith” cases, and the last sentence of Article 13(2), 
damages in lump sum for “bad faith” cases, are very similar in the calculation 
of amounts to be paid to trade secret holder.191  Additionally, there is a 
possibility that in “good faith” and “bad faith” cases of trade secret 
infringement, the amount of pecuniary compensation is not to exceed the 
amount of royalties, and the amount of damages, if set as a lump sum at a 
minimum in the amount of royalties, can result in similar amounts to be paid to 
trade secret holder.192  The application of such principles theoretically causes 
unreasonably unequal rights to the benefit of person that in bad faith received 
trade secret. 
d. The USTA and U.S. Case Law 
Under the USTA, “damages can include both the actual loss caused by the 
misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is 
not taken into account in computing actual loss.”193  Damages may also be 
measured by the “imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a 
misappropriator’s unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.”194  
However, “in order to justify this alternative measure of damages, there must 
be competent evidence to support of the amount of a reasonable royalty.”195  In 
a case of willful and malicious misappropriation, the court can award 
 
189.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 13(2); GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, 
supra note 8, at art. 13(2).  
190.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, art. 13(2), para. 2; GENERAL APPROACH TO THE 
PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at art 13(2), para. 2.  
191.  COMMISSION DRAFT, supra note 7, arts. 12(3), 13(2).  
192.  Id.  
193.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a).  
194.  Id. 
195.  Id. § 3(a) cmt.  
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exemplary damages in addition to the actual recovery in an amount not to 
exceed twice that recovery.196  In a recent U.S. case,197 a California court, 
“addressing the rule that a reasonable royalty available for trade secret 
misappropriation only where neither damages nor unjust enrichment are 
‘provable,’”198 concluded that a “reasonable royalty is available . . . where 
plaintiff could not prove any loss and defendant made no actual profits” and, 
therefore, the fact that defendant establishes that it lost money from the 
misappropriation does not defeat a claim for reasonable royalties.199 
III.  FUTURE CHALLENGES 
A. Handling Employees 
Handling employees and ensuring their loyalty is a perpetual challenge for 
employers.  In actuality, “employees may be one of the biggest leaks of 
improperly disclosed trade secrets.”200  In the U.S., “[t]he majority of cases 
involves alleged misappropriators known by the trade secret owner involves 
either an employee or a business partner.”201  The same tendency will most 
likely be followed in Europe after the Council Proposal’s adoption.  When 
unified legal standards for trade secrets are implemented in the EU, both 
employers and employees will become aware of their rights and duties, which 
can significantly affect the amount of legal proceedings in the EU. 
Therefore, every company, especially those in the manufacturing industry, 
should take practical steps now (if they are not already in place) to protect the 
trade secrets it owns or uses from misappropriation, and limit the possibility of 
litigation.  For instance, companies should (i) describe the information 
considered to be a trade secret, (ii) identify when the information was originally 
created, (iii) describe the development of the information or how it was 
obtained; (iv) list the persons that have access to the information, (v) give a 
“level of classification required to provide adequate protection of the secrecy 
 
196.  Id. §3(b).  
197.  Ajaxo Inc. v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 168, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding 
“that E*Trade did not profit from its misappropriation, unjust enrichment is not ‘provable’. . . [s]ince 
E*Trade had consistently and successfully taken the position that Ajaxo’s actual losses are not 
provable, E*Trade is estopped from arguing otherwise. Thus, since neither actual loss nor unjust 
enrichment is provable, the trial court had discretion . . . to order payment of a reasonable royalty”). 
198.  1-1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[3] (2011). 
199.  Id.; Ajaxo Inc., 115 Cal.Rptr. 3d at 172.  
200.  ERIC M. DOBRUSIN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CULTURE: STRATEGIES TO FOSTER 
SUCCESSFULLY PATENT AND TRADE SECRET PRACTICES IN EVERYDAY BUSINESS 269 (2008). 
201.  STUDY ON TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION IN THE 
INTERNAL MARKET, supra note 1, at 106. 
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of the information,”202 (vi) enter appropriate and relevant non-disclosure and 
non-compete agreements with employees, and (vii) include trade secrets’ 
protection measures in intellectual property and overall business strategy.”203 
Similarly important, employers need to “establish strong psychological 
loyalty with its employees to stand a better chance of seeing its non- disclosure 
and non-compete agreements being effective and thus safeguarding its trade 
secrets.” 204 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The adoption of the Council Proposal will establish unified legal standards 
for defending trade secrets across the EU.  As a result, trade secrets will be able 
to “fulfil [sic] their potential as drivers of economic growth and jobs”205 within 
the EU. Furthermore, unified standards will provide greater incentives for 
businesses to engage in innovative cross-border activity within the internal 
market. Some of the Council Proposal’s provisions still need improvements and 
adjustments to business needs and realities.  Additionally, full harmonization 
of trade secret protection would be more efficient than the currently proposed 
minimum harmonization.  Nevertheless, irrespective of some deficiencies in 
the Council Proposal’s text, the Council Proposal, as such, is a long awaited 
and vital step towards trade secrets’ harmonization for all EU countries. 
 
 
 
 
202.  CHRISTOPHER M. ARENA & EDUARDO M. CARRERAS, THE BUSINESS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 253 (2008). 
203.  See generally TALHIYA SHEIKH, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, 
TRADE SECRETS AND EMPLOYEE LOYALTY, http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/trade_secrets_e
mployee_loyalty.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). 
204.  Id.  
205.  See GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at recital 3; COMMISSION 
DRAFT, supra note 7, at recital 3.  
